Within Hanisch's statist framework, one must stress the persistence and slow transformation of legalistic values revolving around group status and the protection (via alliance with the state) ofgroup entitlements and interests -in short, the values of corporatism. Thirty years ago, invoking corporatism as a conceptual guide to serious scholarship would have raised arched eyebrows, and even today it excites mixed emotions. A modem version of the ancient notion of corporatism was notoriously fashionable as a social nostrum in right-wing circles of the early twentieth century; after 1922 it acquired a powerful stigma in the minds of western progressives -liberals and socialists alike -due to its association with Mussolini's Fascism and its emulators. One of these imitators was precisely the 1930s Austrian dictatorship of Engelbert Dollfuss and Kurt von Schuschnigg -a political cul-desac that remains an embarrassment in Austria today, almost as much as the Nazi regime itself. In the 1970s, however, the corporatist taboo was refurbished by political scientists interested in interactions between interest groups and the neoliberal regulatory state, and there is now a swelling literature on its relevance to social science.5 (To avoid confusion over terms, it should be noted that this essay uses the expression "neoliberal" in the sense of"social liberalism" -as born in the era of Friedrich Naumann -as opposed to the doctrine of the unrestrained free market, as the word is sometimes employed nowadays).
Philippe Schmitter, a leader in the renaissance of interest.in corporatism, describes contemporary social corporatism as: a distinctive way of organizing interests and influencing public policy.... one of several possible arrangements through which interest associations can intermediate between their members (individuals, families, firms, groups of all kinds) and their interlocutors (especially agencies of the state with authority and other resources to satisfy their demands).6
In the schematic parlance of political science, Schmitter contrasts corporatism (characterized by such features as "monopolistic units," "hierarchichal coordination," and "devolved implementation") with "pluralism" (distinguished by "multiple units," "autonomous interaction," and "persuasive conviction").7
Many authorities would concur that, in Austria, membership in the type of legally defined corporate bodies described by Schmitter remains a benchmark of identity and social possibility -i.e., an Austrian Sonderbewusstsein.8 This has mitigated the definitive triumph of a pronounced individualist and free-market ethos such as that associated with a group of late-nineteenth-century Austrian economists now known (somewhat paradoxically, considering the small resonance their doctrines had in post-1918 Austria itself) as the "Austrian School" of economic theory. Among scholarship's unfinished tasks is the rigorous grounding ofthe work of these thinkers -Carl Menger, Friedrich von Wieser, and Eugen von BohmBawerk -in the context of late-nineteenth-century Austrian life.9 They were drawn to Smithian liberalism precisely because the antithetical assumptions of the Baroque and Josefinian Polizeistaat persisted so strongly and often oppressively in the Austria of their day. Yet even within the Menger school there were echoes of the regulatory Obrigkeitsstaat. Despite their heretical attraction to laissez-faire, their thought patterns had substantial cameralist roots.'0 They too labored under the "long shadow of the state," and Bohm-Bawerk became one of the state ' In practical terms, however, just as significant as such neoconservative ideas for transforming yet perpetuating the corporatist heritage were the chambers of commerce and industry and the weighted voting classes (curia, or electoral colleges) that evolved after 1848 as nonegalitarian mechanisms for representing special interests in the emerging age of mass politics. These institutions were championed not by antimodernists, but precisely by the liberals that men like Muller and Vogelsang despised, showing that antimoderists held no monopoly on the corporate paradigm, and that -in the Austrian context -progressivism and corporatism were perfectly compatible. (And after 1945 it would become clear how compatible corporatist paradigms were with social democracy -which, pragmatically speaking, began evolving into a form of neoliberalism after the 1880s.) In fact (and this is perhaps the main thesis of the present essay), one way to broadly imagine moder Austrian history since 1848 might be in terms of a counterpoint between liberal and nonliberal variations on the corporatist theme-counterpoint being understood here in something close to its literal musical sense, i.e., "melody not single, but moving attended by one or more related but independent melodies."'3 (Again, to avoid confusion, the expression liberal corporatism is used here to mean corporatist arrangements within the framework of the existing or emerging parliamentary/democratic Rechtsstaat.)
In view of its overall lack of success as an organized political movement in Austria (reaching its nadir in the 1930s and early 1940s), the suggestion that liberalism might help us understand the peculiarities ofAustrian history might seem far stranger than the appeal to corporatism. Indeed, a key motif of Hanisch's imposing survey -even though its narrative commences in the heyday of cultural liberalism, the 1890s-is the persistence in Austria ofa popular Untertanenmentalitdt and the weakness of liberalism, parliamentary institutions, and civil society generally. Granted, in Austria (as in Bismarck's Germany) liberalism operated under significant restraints right from the outset of the parliamentary era in 1867, since its delegates had no solid control over the appointment and tenure of cabinets or over military budgets. Moreover, upper middle-class Honoratiorenliberalismus suffered sobering setbacks after 1879 at the hands of Count Taaffe's "iron ring" coalition of Slavs, federalists, and clericals (on the imperial level) and (in Vienna) amidst the rise of mass political movements of the irrational "sharper key" (schdrfere One-dimensional focus on prewar extremists diverts the spotlight from the successes of mainstream national liberals in the hybridized liberal-corporatist culture of Austria prior to 1914, and inhibits appreciation of the potential vitality of that political culture itself, as well as its relevance for today's Austria. Granted, mainstream national liberalism moved in a more ethnocentric, populist direction, and its rhetoric was frequently strident, often embracing (depending on the locality) anti-Czech, anti-Slovene, or anti-Semitic conceits. The fact that it became less generous does not disqualify it as liberalism, however, for ungenerous liberalisms abounded at the time -not least in Britain and America.
It would be foolish to deny that national liberalism's adjustments were devoid of disquieting potential,23 or to speculate on the survival chances of Old Austria's political culture in the absence of World War I. What is clear is that, with its tactical modifications, pre-1914 liberalism remained quite successful in regional and municipal politics outside Vienna, domain of the renegade liberal Lueger.24 Schorske's interpretation (based in turn on Wandruszka) depicted Austrian politics as tending only toward so-called "post-liberal" radicalism, but pre-1914 Austria included more than Vienna and was laden with other possible outcomes.25
Thus, a hybridized liberal/bureaucratic framework for civil society -and the rudiments of a political culture to flesh it out -were indeed serviceable legacies of Old Austria to its successor states. True, as Wolfgang Mantl suggests,26 under the world economic and geopolitical circumstances that followed World War I those rudiments could not take root, and acute political dysfunction was the consequence. There was a dramatic eclipse ofAustrian liberalism and, some feared, all other liberalisms worldwide. In that setting, there never could be a mass-based liberal Lager; the very word "liberal" was additionally burdened in the Austrian context by associations with the 1873 stock market crash and philo-Semitism. What happened in Weimar Germany more gradually -the contraction of the liberal middle and its absorption into polarized factions -was already largely a fact in Austria in 1919, confirmed by the resounding failure of the still-born BiirgerlichDemokratische Partei in the elections of that year. Even today the term liberal remains a political liability, a situation complicated by the persistent Marxist myth that liberalism was really a way station for fascism, and the fact that after 1945 the words liberal,freiheitlich, and what was left of the old national liberal tradition were often used as havens by ex-Nazis.27 There is surely much to the notion that, in the bewildering conditions after 1918, the diverse corporatist mindsets of the prewar period helped create a disposition to support, underestimate, or otherwise fail to comprehend the related but distinctly new phenomenon of fascist corporatism based on radically new concepts of the state, the law, and the individual. 28 On the whole, however, I would argue that in interwar Austria (as in Germany) the triumph ofilliberalism was less the result of decline that set in before 1914 than the product of short-term contingencies created by the radicalizing engine of the Great War. The war was indeed a massive cleavage; it was this "radical rupture," as one recent author correctly affirms, that "more than any kind of perceived continuity between pre-and postwar German society...produced National Socialism in Germany -and fascism in other countries."29 Still, revisionist socialism was not swamped by the war, and by the 1920s German and Austrian Social Democracy (beneath their often extremist rhetoric) had become potential conduits for revisionist liberalism and liberal corporatism, should favorable conditions arise. After 1945, amidst new circumstances produced by Hitler's defeat and the advent of the Cold War, a hybridized neoliberal corporatism strongly indebted to the statist, bureaucratic, and legalistic political culture of the late Habsburg past supplanted the antiliberal corporatisms that dominated between the wars. To be sure, native liberalism's final victory came only after native illiberalisms were crushed by foreign powers, and following a decade of alien occupation. But, after all, ten years is not so long a time, and without substantial roots in the moder past the new neoliberal system could not have taken hold.
In this setting, the hermetically sealed Catholic, socialist, and nationalist Lager that arose in the 1880s -that polarized Austria after 1918 and reduced it to civil war in the 1930s -were recast into neocorporate frameworks for parity, patronage, mutual consultation, conflict resolution, and resource allocation. What formerly divided the country now held it together. The parties to this Sozialpartnerschaft did not call themselves liberals, but Socialists and Christian populists, and their leaders were certainly not inspired by feelings of kinship with older liberal traditions. Their actions were often motivated by the narrowest cynicism and expediency.30 The words freiheitlich and liberal, still redolent of musty positivism, dogmatic anticlericalism, and Austro-German progressivism' s more ethnocentric and exclusionary "national liberal" turn on the eve of World War I, were left to the dregs of the nationalist Lager -fatally discredited by its association with Hitler (though its members were eagerly recruited by the Socialist and Christian democratic parties). Or, the term liberal was understood pejoratively in a doctrinaire laissez-faire sense, as alien to Austrian life, a one-dimensional interpretation that seemed ironically reinforced by the antistatist views of the Austrian exile Hayek-to the extent that these ideas were known at all in post-1945 Austria.
Efforts to weld a non-Socialist and non-Catholic third party option from diverse middle class, nonunionized, displaced Volksdeutsche, and ex-Nazi constituencies, culminating in creation of the Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs (FPO) in 1955, remained factionalized, programmatically unstable, and easily stigmatized as rightist and extremist -not least because the first two FPO leaders were, respectively, a former minister in Seyss-Inquart's Anschluss cabinet of 1938 (Anton Reinthaller), and an ex-member of the Waffen-SS (Friedrich Peter). Initially ostracized, the party enjoyed minimal electoral success prior to the late 1980s (although the Realpolitiker Bruno Kreisky shrewdly employed the small party to sustain Socialist cabinets between 1970 and 1983, and the FPO was even embraced as a Socialist coalition partner from 1983 to 1986). Beneath the language and surface static of histoire evenementielle, however, postwar Austria became a capitalist welfare state of the neoliberal type, erected on neocorporate arrangements and linked economically to West Germany (which allowed it to prosper). And West Germany, in its own peculiar way, exhibited pronounced neocorporatist features that stretched back through the Weimar to the Wilhelmine period. As usual, the peculiarities of Austrian history evolved in the context of a broader Germanlanguage framework of historical peculiarities.31
While citizens ofthe reinvented state were still not sure ifthey were "Austrians," "Germans," "Viennese," "Tyrolese," or kinfolk of some other Heimat, most ofthem relished the social peace, affluence, and material security sustained by the system. Still, the new Kleinosterreich was not in every respect ideal.32 In broad terms, Philippe Schmitter has described the downside of neocorporatist practices for any society:
Although the finding that corporatist arrangements contribute to "govemability" through greater citizen compliance, and fiscal effectiveness seems widely accepted, the suspicion persists that they surreptitiously undermine democracy. Organizations replace persons as the principal participants; specialized professionals gain at the expense of citizen amateurs; direct functional channels of representation to state agencies displace territorially based legislative decision making; monopolies and privileged access are recognized at the expense of overlapping and competing associations; comprehensive national hierarchies diminish the autonomy of local and specialized organizations. It is these historically specific conditions ofthe 1980s and 1990s that impact present Austrian social structures and voter behavior, and that are mainly behind the illiberal protest populism exemplified by J6rg Haider and the revamped FPO today -not a vestigial fascism or "unmastered past." Diethelm Prowe is correct in maintaining that the new wave of populism in Europe is not a reprise of interwar fascism.37 "Classic" fascism (as Ernst Nolte argued) should be understood in its interwar setting, and we need new terms and categories to designate movements that arise from late twentieth and early twenty-first century conditions. This is not to deny the many disturbing aspects of the new populism. And it is not to trivialize the issue of an unmastered past. The past is indeed in the present, and its unmastered aspects are clearly important for the ways Austria's scholars, novelists, and mass media conceptualize the country's history, which in turn affect people's present behavior and their visions of the future. It is just that the issue of an unconquered past should not be confused with the mainsprings of present political dynamics. Like the older extremism, the new populism is a product of social alienation, but that malaise is not akin to the victimization psychosis and antimodernist nostalgia that fed fascism in the 1920s and 1930s. The roots ofprotest populism today do not lie in the estrangement ofAustrian voters from the conditions of modem life -democratization, industrialization, secularization, urbanization -but in fear (increasingly among blue collar workers) that the fruits of these very modem conditions -secure jobs, affluence, and welfare safety nets -will be lost.
In a sense, the inventors of post-1945 Austria's black-red consensualism were too successful. They fashioned a model welfare state which integrated ordinary Austrians into modernity. But problems arise when this ingrown elite cannot quarantine its creation from external change, and also succumbs to the corrupting seductions of wealth and power based on old-boy networks and bureaucratic bloat and inbreeding. Nimble opportunists such as Jorg Haider will, not surprisingly, arise to capitalize on resentments over the "politics as usual" corporatism of mismanagement, waste, and personal enrichment, and will exploit fears that the modernizing achievements of this very corporatist system will be squandered. In his frequent reliance on the tactics of negative integration, the "telegenic" Haider may indeed recall der sch6ne Karl Lueger of a previousfin-de-siecle; his speech, and the unspoken lines between it (like that of Lueger before him), is reckless and stretches the boundaries of "civil" discourse-a notoriously sensitive issue in German-speaking Europe, precisely because of that region's troubled recent past. But the global, European, and local setting in which Haider operates is rather different from the world of Lueger.
From a new turn-of-the-century standpoint, one may hazard some final thoughts regarding Austria's position in Europe, the current language of scholarship and politics, and the historiographical and political relevance of Austria's liberal tradition. The thought of instrumentalizing heritage, or "memory," as a means to noble or ignoble ends, of constructing "usable" pasts to promote current agendas, must properly haunt those who honor the past's alien integrity -for the good of present and future as well as the past itself. Nowhere have orchestrations of history been more notoriously abused than in moder Central Europe.
Yet past and present are existentially inseparable. Liberalism, as this essay has argued, has demonstrated vastly more staying power than pundits predicted in the troubled aftermath of World War I and the Great Depression, or even in the more hopeful wake of World War II. Nowhere, in those days, did liberalism's future look more bleak than in Germany and Austria. Today, self-styled "Liberal" parties remain relatively weak sisters in the middle European political game (the FDP, the FPO). Yet who could deny that, at the end of our short twentieth century, neoliberal structures govern the limits of the possible in Central and Western Europe, and free market rhetoric controls global political discourse? As Austrians, in this world setting and in the course of a new kind ofAnschluss, engage the German-and French-led process of European Union, sharing the challenges of inventing that emerging polity, they may gradually find it increasingly natural to attend more closely to thecomparative study of liberalism in its many guises, to attach greater value to Central European liberalism's peculiar native roots, and to allow a critical regard for Austria's own liberal traditions larger room in their psychological space. Two or three decades ago, a book such as this might have been presented as something more abstract and less immediately relevant to present concerns -a contribution to Old Austria's Staats-undReichsproblem, the history ofthe empire's presumed terminal dysfunctionality, the nationality problem, or the political dregs ofthe 1867Ausgleich. Haider's gloss ofthe documents is amodel ofhistoriographical tact, one that situates the protocols firmly in the psychic space and social circumstances of their own time. Yet despite her healthy respect for old-fashioned Verstehen, the fact that she conceptualizes her book not only as a contribution to Austria's "constitutional and parliamentary history," but to the history of liberalism as well, seems-under present circumstances-not merely historiographically significant but politically aktuell. 24Boyer's former stress on the liberals' "inability to retain local and regional power bases" after initial reverses on the imperial level in 1879 ("Freud, Marriage, and Late Viennese Liberalism," 74) has been proven wrong by subsequent research. It is now widely agreed that our understanding of civic culture and its vitality in late Habsburg Austria has been skewed by focusing so much on Vienna which, except for the fact that it was the imperial seat, was in many ways only one of many diverse regional cases. 25H6belt's Kornblume und Kaiseradler argues that, even on the imperial level, liberals were more politically successful than was previously thought. Thus, in modified form, liberal structures and habits of thought and action remained alive, sustained in part by a corporatism compatible with the enlightened bureaucratism of Josefinian rationalism and the more democratic mechanisms of the constitutional Rechtsstaat. One of his more novel ideas in this regard is that the convoluted system of government by threat of emergency decree employed by Austria's prime ministers after 1900 was rather suited to local circumstances, and actually worked, if not always well. At least there was not paralysis. 
